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JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: THE WILLIAMSBURG
CONSENSUS-SOME ERRORS AND OMISSIONS
JAMEs G. FRANCE*
Courts, particularly state trial courts, have been under increasing
criticism in recent years for their inefficient disposition of the contro-
versies brought before them for decision. The attack has proceeded
on many fronts: the movement of important public policy questions in
taxation, school management, elections, and legislative representation
from the state to the federal courts; the setting aside of criminal con-
victions for violation of the constitutional rights of defendants; the
production-line methods of the criminal courts, coupled with the slow-
ness of the criminal process; and the huge backlogs and consequent
delays in hearing and deciding personal injury litigation. The delay in
personal injury litigation is an important contributing cause to the
pressures for "no fault" insurance, and because many state legislatures
as well as Congress have seriously considered the adoption of no fault
plans, this last criticism seems to be the most telling of all.
As a result of these criticisms, and to remedy the apparent weakness
of the court systems, more than a dozen states are examining various
reforms.' The agencies and consultants recommending the reforms
* A.B., Brown University; LL.B., Yale Law School. Project Director for Tennessee
and South Carolina court surveys, Institute of Judicial Administration, Inc. Formerly,
Judge, Court of Appeals, 7th Appellate District, Ohio.
1. A partial list of the reforms adopted, in progress, or in study is as follows:
Florida
Structural reform of all trial courts was recommended in 1971. A constitutional
amendment package embodying these reforms was adopted in March, 1972.
Georgia
Pilot studies began in 1971; full scale studies commenced in April, 1972.
Illinois
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vary from state to state. For example, several states utilize local bar
resources or state university institutes of government, with a minimum
of outside consulting aid;2 other states rely heavily upon independent
consultants such as the Institute of Judicial Administration,8 the Ameri-
can Judicature Society,4 or the Institute of Court Management.'
As different institutions have examined these problems, a variety of
Structural and administrative reforms of general and limited jurisdiction trial courts
were completed in the late 1960's.
Kentucky
Studies were initiated in 1971.
Louisiana
Administrative reforms in general jurisdiction and appellate courts were recom-
mended in March, 1972.
Maine
Limited jurisdiction court reform was completed in 1961; general jurisdiction court
admifiistrative reforms were recommended in 1970.
Mississippi
A survey of court structure was completed in 1969.
New Jersey
Structural and administrative reforms in the general jurisdiction and appellate courts
were completed by the 1950's; restructuring and integration of the limited jurisdiction
courts into the unified system was recommended in 1971.
North Carolina
Structural and administrative reforms of appellate, general, and limited jurisdiction
courts were initiated in the mid-1960's and completed in 1971.
Ohio
Structural reforms of general jurisdiction courts were completed in 1968; administra-
tive and procedural reforms were initiated in 1970-71.
Pennsylvania
Structural reform, including special constitutional provisions affecting the Philadelphia
criminal process, were completed in 1968.
South Carolina
Structural reform of all courts was recommended in 1971.
Tennessee
Structural reform of all courts was recommended in 1971.
Virginia
Structural reforms were recommended in 1971-72.
In addition there are several studies which probably will result in proposals for
reform in the following major cities: Boston, Detroit, Providence, Minneapolis, Cleve-
land, Fort Wayne, Miami, and Philadelphia.
2. These states include Pennsylvania, Ohio, Mississippi, North Carolina, Virginia, and
Kentucky.
3. The Institute of Judicial Administration has studied the following states: Maine,
Tennessee, South Carolina, Louisiana, Delaware, and Maryland.
4. The American Judicature Society is conducting the Miami survey and has assisted
in several of the state studies.
5. The Institute of Court Management is making most of the surveys of individual
cities.
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suggested reforms have emerged. In some states, the reforms focus
on structural improvements. 6 Their concern is with the jurisdictional
interplay between courts. By consolidating a hodge-podge of dupli-
cating courts, it is hoped that some sort of simple judicial organization
can be achieved that would function more effectively. Other state
efforts are concerned with administrative restructuring7 as well as jur-
isdictional efficiency. Still others focus primarily on a revamping of
the management structure and organization of inefficient courts.8 Al-
though much of the concern has been with structural reform, other
approaches emphasize calendaring practices, trial settings, pretrial pro-
ceedings, and control of the discovery process in their attempts to
revitalize inefficient court systems. s
Most of the structural reforms have followed the scheme of the
American Bar Association's 1938 recommendations, as modified in
1962 by its Section on Judicial Administration in producing the Model
Judicial Article for state constitutions.10 As the recommendations con-
cerned the trial courts, a two-level system was generally proposed, con-
sisting of a superior level or general jurisdiction court and a limited
jurisdiction court for small claims, misdemeanors, and traffic offense
adjudications. The reports differ on the questions of whether the
limited jurisdiction court should be a court of record and whether
appeals should go to the superior trial court or to an intermediate court
of appeals. Generally, however, the two-level trial court system, as
borrowed from the branch system proposed by Roscoe Pound," was
presented. Special jurisdictional courts were not recommended specifi-
cally, but most suggestions favored the gradual assimilation of exist-
ing probate and juvenile courts into one or the other of the trial courts,
following the Pound principle that there must be, not specialized
courts, but specialist judges in the general courts.
On administrative structure, the recommendations of the Model
Judicial Article were somewhat sketchy. This was understandable in
the case of the constitutional provisions, but puzzling insofar as the
various consultants' rather voluminous offerings were concerned. It was
made clear that there should be centralized administrative authority
6. The initial Ohio and Pennsylvania reforms and the Tennessee, Florida, and South
Carolina recommendations and adoptions were almost entirely structural.
7. The Illinois and North Carolina efforts fit into this category.
8. Maine and Louisiana fit into this category.
9. See the recent Ohio Rules of Superintendence.
10. The Model Article appears in 87 REPoRTs os ABA 392 (1962).
11. R. PouND, OaoaNzAroN op CoupTs, 272-93 (1940).
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in the Chief Justice of the state, to be exercised through a statewide
court administrator with such assistants "as he deems necessary" to aid
in the administration of the courts of the state. By implication (and
by reference to the committee comment of the Section on Judicial
Administration), this appeared to comprehend the hierarchial administra-
tive system of New Jersey. This includes placing the responsibility
for reporting on case flow with an administrative chain of command
which flows from local administrator to state administrator to Chief
Justice, rather than the Pound plan which made the local administrator
responsible to the local, regional, and statewide presiding judges.'2 Many
of the consultants' reports as to state systems were equally sketchy and
left much to inference, although a few adopted the details of the
hierarchial system.j 3
THE CONSENSUS
In March, 1971, the reform movement continued as the National
Conference on the Judiciary convened in Williamsburg, Virginia, under
the cosponsorship of most of the national consulting organizations. The
Conference arrived at conclusions which were embodied in a Consen-
sus Statement and approved by the Conference executive committee.
In many respects the Consensus Statement followed the familiar trail
of the American Bar Association's offering. Merit selection and tenure
of judges was emphasized, as were adequate compensation and retire-
ment plans. The unified judicial system under the Chief Justice of each
state, including the doctrine of compulsory geographical assignment of
local judges, was recommended. But in some respects the Consensus
Statement went into considerable operational detail which was missing
from the consultants' reports. On the criminal side of the trial court,
but not the civil, judicial control of the docket was endorsed fully,
as was judicial participation in the jurors' voir dire. Speedy criminal
trial was emphasized, but little was said about the time lag in civil
12. The committee comment on § 8 [ 2 of the Model Article elucidates that the
New Jersey model is the one used: "The desirability of the concept has been proved
by the experience in the New Jersey system which adopted such a method of ad-
ministering its courts." The Pound thesis was that "[elach of the branches, and where
conditions require them, each division or regional division within a branch should
have a responsible head, charged with the duty of immediate superintendence." R.
PoUND, supra note 11, at 284-85.
13. Maine and Louisiana adopted this system. See THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL AD-
MINISTRATION, THE SUPRME AND SUPERIOR COURTS OF MAINE, A STUDY (1970); THE
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINSTRATION, A STUDY OF THE LOUISIANA COURT SYSTEM (1972).
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matters. Nearly 40 percent of the statement was concerned with
criminal standards of justice: bail, preventive detention, defense of
the indigent, sentencing, probation, and post conviction remedies. How-
ever, any reference to legal aid, lawyer referral, garnishment, civil
imprisonment, poor debtor relief, and similar matters on the civil side
of the courts was omitted.
This emphasis on the criminal process, to the exclusion of the civil
process and its method, was understandable. The Conference was
financed in major part by Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
funds, and the emphasis on criminal operational theory was in tribute
to the principle that he who pays the piper calls the tune. Had the
authors of the Consensus made clear that they, and the Conference,
were concerned only with the criminal process, there would have been
much good and little harm resulting. The statement would have been
received in the context of an effort to improve the administration of
criminal justice only.
But the Consensus, unfortunately, went far beyond a prescription
for the improvement of criminal justice. It undertook to tamper with
the Pound, the Vanderbilt, and the American Bar proposals on structure
and administration, all for the unstated, but nonetheless implicit, pur-
pose of improving criminal justice regardless of any adverse affect on
the civil justice sector. It appeared determined to direct the entire
apparatus and organization of the courts to the control of crime at the
expense of improving them for the solution of private litigation, much
as the proponents of the individual judge's docket have endeavored
to push all judges into the field of criminal adjudication as an item of
first priority, regardless of the confusion it engenders in the bar and the
vastly increased cost of criminal prosecution.14 Two major structural
recommendations with impact on the civil side of the courts are in-
cluded in the Consensus Statement. The first is that there should be
"only one level of trial court, divided into districts of manageable
size." Taken in combination with the general statement that "civil
and criminal matters which can be better handled outside the judicial
14. For discussion of the confusion produced by the individual judge's docket in
Philadelphia and Cleveland, see p. 35 infra. In Philadelphia the whole bench has not
been shifted to the criminal docket and the problems are confined to the tort field. In
Cleveland both the state and the federal bench shifted to criminal case coverage of
the individual judge's docket as an item of first priority. Where formerly eight state
court judges and one federal court judge competed for the attendance of a limited "21st
Street" criminal bar, now 26 state and eight federal judges are in the competition.
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system should be eliminated from the jurisdiction of the courts," 15 it
would appear that the Conference desired to eliminate not only traffic
offenses and victimless crimes, but the collection business and the traffic
accident reparations system from the courts' domain. Thus, the Con-
ference appeared to prefer to substitute government bureaus, no fault,
and other plans, none of which were spelled out.
This recommendation abruptly reversed at least 30 years of study
by the American Bar Association and most of the national consulting
organizations. Since no supporting data for the new conclusion was
offered or even alluded to in the statement, it seems to have been made
capriciously, without documentation, and even without advance prepa-
ration, as something in the nature of a brainstorm or a trial balloon.
In short, it appears to have been thrown in gratuitously to indicate only
that the authors were thinking about and planning for the civil side of
the courts, even if in fact they were not, except in terms of how to
subordinate it to the criminal process and to demonstrate a rounded
concern for the whole of the courts' problems, which concern did not,
in fact, exist.
The second recommendation was that specialized courts "should be
abolished." 16 This recommendation appeared to be deliberately phrased
to outrage the advocates for specialized courts, such as the juvenile
experts, who have been successful in introducing the concept of the
Family Court into many states. It also should have demoralized the
American Bar Association's special committee on the Traffic Court
Program, which for many years has been successfully promoting the
creation of these specialized courts. To recommend a gradual assimi-
lation of these courts into a divisionalized two level trial court system
is one thing. To raise the cry, "off with their heads," without warning,
documentation, or a stated reason, seems a tactless invitation to a head-
on fight with well entrenched pressure groups commanding the support
of numerous sympathetic followers.
Since no specific reasons were advanced in support of either of these
sweeping conclusions, and since no data was cited or apparently used
to justify either the structural recommendations, the need for para-
judicial talent, or for the hierarchial administrative system, this article
will examine selected performance data so as to determine the relative
efficiency of the single court, the two-level trial court, and the multi-
15. Fnwmw s Am CONcLuSiNS OF Tm NATONAL ComRaCE oF T JuDIaARY, Cox-




level court and specialized systems. Secondly, the article will discuss
the effect which is produced on performance by the use of both the
isolated court administrator and the hierarchial system of administration.
In addition, the performance of various operational devices, such as
calendaring systems and controls on dockets, will be analyzed to deter-
mine whether they promote earlier trials or whether they achieve
expeditious dispositions without trial. Pretrial devices, such as the pre-
trial conference and the late and early settlement conferences, will be
analyzed in a similar manner.
TAm MEASUREMENT OF PERFORMANCE
If there is any one area of judicial administration in which there is
a paucity of observed and measured results, combined with a profusion
of ideas on measurement methods, it is in developing standards to meas-
ure the performance of courts, particularly trial courts, as instruments
of justice. There is, of course, the quality of justice meted out, which
many would like to measure for the purposes of comparison of courts,
judges, and systems. The reversal record on appeal is a possible basis
of measurement, but it concerns very few cases and very few judges.
Furthermore, a rating scale on so subjective a matter is almost impossible
to construct.
The raw quantity of both the case load or intake, and the productivity
or output, of any given court or system can be measured exactly. Many
state court administrators use this type of measurement for their
courts, with cases filed per judge and cases terminated per judge for
each court in the system.1t As a purely internal comparison, this meas-
urement has value. The relative caseload per judge, as well as the
population per judge, has been converted into a criterion to measure
the necessity for creating new judgeships within each individual state.
But for interstate and intersystem comparisons, the caseload per judge
and productivity per judge tests have serious drawbacks. From district
to district and from county to county within the same state, the mix
of cases in degree of difficulty is likely to remain comparatively con-
17. The Ohio Courts Annual, published by the Administrative Director, which
formerly gave much attention to the detail of ranking the trial courts by performance
in several categories, now concentrates on showing filings and terminations per judge
in only three categories: criminal, civil, -and domestic relations. Published monthly
reports have eliminated input and output detail, apparently because the Ohio Supreme
Court desires to keep trial court productivity figures restricted during the early period.
of its changeover of systems required by the Rules of Superintendence effective Jan-
uary 1, 1972.
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stant, although the volume of some types of matters, such as muggings,
car strippings, will construction actions, auto tort cases, and stock-
holders' derivative actions, seem to cluster more in the metropolitan
courts. But the number of cases filed, or terminated, per judge in
state X may have no reasonable relationship to the number in state Y
because of the difference in the quality of the caseload from state to
state. For example, some states permit confessions of judgment on war-
rant of authority contained in instruments creating an obligation,
and the volume of these "cognovit" judgments, which require an abso-
lute minimum of judicial effort, are high in many geographical areas
of states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois.18 Proceedings for the
emancipation of minors and of adoptions, which require little time and
effort, are high in the superior trial courts' caseload in some states,
but are shunted to the separate probate and juvenile courts in others.
In some states, equity foreclosure of real property mortgages is a large
item in the total judicial business, but in strict foreclosure states there
is little judicial business of this sort. The same variation, to a lesser
degree, occurs in the criminal field, where the superior trial courts in
some states process a multitude of misdemeanor prosecutions, including
traffic violations, which in others are disposed of in city or county courts
of limited jurisdiction. Due to these differences, the intake-output test
is not always a satisfactory measurement of performance.
The time span from arrest to conviction, with or without sentencing,
or to acquittal in criminal cases, represents a reasonable measuring stick
of performance and has been used for comparison purposes among the
states by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement. Considering
current interest in speedy criminal dispositions, it might be the most
worthwhile of the performance yardsticks but for one factor: In most
states the criminal process cuts across the lines of two sets of courts-
the limited jurisdiction court for determination of probable cause and
the superior court for trial after grand jury indictment. Since neither
court has effective control over the other's operations, it is somewhat
unfair to charge the superior trial court, which is usually the one meas-
ured, with the delays caused by the magistrate.19 It is also to be assumed
18. Currently some eight states have retained this antediluvian judgment confession
device, without which local bankers claim they would be unable to stay in business.
The three states mentioned in the text are the only major ones with which this study
is concerned, and no detailed study of Illinois has been made. The observations were
for the years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191
(1972).
19. For an extreme example of the deficiencies of a magistrate's court which mar the
[Vol. 14:1
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that most jurisdictions hearkening to the call of the Conference will
produce a spate of statistics showing how much improvement has been
produced in the criminal process, to the exclusion of civil process im-
provement. Consequendy, an emphasis on some phase of the civil field
seems indicated.
It is in the civil litigation field that the most activity in measuring the
time span of cases has occurred, but here again care must be used in
the type of cases selected for measurement. The "all cases filed" or
"all cases disposed of" selection will produce wide apparent differences
from state to state. However, these differences may be mere reflections
of the high bulk of instant disposition cases, such as cognovit judgments,
and of quick disposition cases such as emancipation and ex parte di-
vorce. Thus a state which permits cognovit judgments or has a large
supply of minors' emancipation actions or an easy policy on uncon-
tested divorce actions will necessarily fare better in comparison with a
state in which most litigation is truly adversary in character. High
volume output would also indicate an exceptionally hard-working judi-
ciary when such may not be the case. The practice of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, in issuing its annual Management
Statistics, follows the "all cases" format. This is not so much a disad-
vantage in the federal filings, which tend toward homogeneity, ° but
it could be misleading in those states with a multitude of instant adjudi-
cations or uncontested matters. 21 A single type of case-the personal in-
record of the general jurisdiction court succeeding to its cases after grand jury indict-
ment, see UNnvmsil oF AKRON, ORDER iN rm CouRTs, 124-27 (1970).
20. The federal courts are not entirely exempt from the "quickie" and no effort
cases. Revival suits, brought solely for the purpose of extending judgment liens on
real property, are the federal equivalents of the state court cognovits and ex parte
divorce proceedings.
21. The misleading nature of this measurement illustrates the problem of the Institute
of Judicial Administration's Calendar Status Studies, note 23 infra. The Allegheny
County Common Pleas Court (Pittsburgh), in its report for 1970-71, states: "The
best parameter for assessing the efficiency of a court is the average age of disposed
civil cases. In the year 1970-71, the average age of disposed civil cases was 16.2 compared
with 18.1 months in the previous year. . . . The Institute of Judicial Administration
of New York University, the recognized clearinghouse for nationwide court statistics,
has reported that the time lag in the disposition of civil cases in our court is again
among the lowest of all metropolitan courts in counties with population exceeding
750,000... :' AZLuHENY CoUNTr CoMmoN PArAs Coutr, 1970-71 REPORT 6 (1971).
As noted in the text, the Institute does not attempt to measure the time lag in civil
cases generally. Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, is not mentioned specifically as
having a low time lag in any type case in the Calendar Status Studies, either for
1970 or for 1971; nor do the Studies or any other publication of the Institute recognize
the average age of disposed civil cases as the best, or even an acceptable, parameter for
1972]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
jury or general tort case-is common to all states; it normally repre-
sents the slowest moving category of cases in any court. It is numerous
enough to be a significant factor in any superior court's workload, and
it is equally threatened today by demands for reform-by no fault in-
surance or the various plans of compulsory arbitration which would
remove it from the ambit of the courts' jurisdiction. Due to these
similarities, the time span for disposition of this particular class of
litigation is most commonly used as the measurement of performance.
But there is no agreement on the extent or the specifics of measure-
ment. Some comparisons, such as those of the Institute of Judicial
Administration's Calendar Status Studies, are concerned only with the
time span of a case which is disposed of by trial, and then only from
the time the pleadings are completed until the time of trial. In two
respects this is the measurement of only the tip of the iceberg, since at
least 60 percent of the filed cases are settled or otherwise disposed of
without trial.2  In addition, practices vary from court to court and
from state to state in the amount of time allowed for opposing lawyers
to complete their issue-framing by the filing of written pleadings.23
judging the efficiency of a court, particularly because of the possible presence of
instant judgment cases, such as cognovits, in the material being averaged.
In the disposition of all tort (trespass) cases, measured from date of filing, the record
of the Allegheny County Common Pleas Court is far different from what the statements
used in the report would indicate. Data submitted to the Studies on the time interval
from issue to trial would indicate that the median tort case was disposed within 15
months and two-thirds of tort cases were disposed within 26 months. Actual measure-
ment from a stratified random sample showed more than 22 months to disposition of
the median and more than 33 months for two-thirds dispositions. For the filing
year 1968, this time span was far inferior to that of Memphis, Tennessee and Jackson-
ville, Florida; somewhat inferior to that of Cincinnati and Columbus, Ohio; on a par
with Cleveland, Ohio; and scarcely better than that of Philadelphia and New Orleans.
The tort cases in the sample for the filing year 1969 were from two to six months
longer in disposition time at each 10 percentile of cases than in filing year 1968.
22. In most of the samples taken in the seven states later described, the highest
percentage of tried cases was 32 percent. In most counties surveyed, it was considerably
less than 20 percent. The percentage earlier reported in New Jersey was 23. M.
ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFcnvE JusncE 22 (1964).
23. The annual pamphlets issued by the Institute of Judicial Administration on the
Studies give a full explanation of this significant subtraction from the total time span
of cases, pointing out that the complaints of many judges are that the time of "issue"
or of the filing of an answer is not really the commencement of the court's responsi-
bility, which should be postponed longer, until the lawyers have filed a certificate of
readiness for trial. Since the collection of such statistics depends on the voluntary
cooperation of the courts, the Institute has accommodated such a view by also showing
a separate column, fixing the readiness for trial date as controlling the start of the period
of delay. Of late some courts have adopted the "from filing of complaint" standard,
[VoIL 14:1
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Other measurements, preferred by state court administrators, are con-
cerned only with the age of those cases still waiting to be tried at any
given time and are not concerned with the number and percentage of
any given year's filings which have already been tried, settled and dis-
missed, or otherwise completed. Some results are stated in terms of
averages and others, especially those which deal with pending cases, are
necessarily stated as medians. Measurements which consider only those
cases disposed of also suffer from what might be called the backward
look; that is, they are interested only in how long it took cases which
were decided within a given time frame to reach trial, without regard
to their classification according to time of filing. What has been sadly
lacking in most measurement processes is any prediction of how long it
will take a given case to reach disposition, whether by trial or settle-
ment, so that today's litigant may have some idea of how long it may
take his case to be decided.
Some effort in the direction of measurement for predictability was
made in the Knight Foundation survey of six northeastern Ohio counties
in 1969-70. Groups of tort cases were selected for each county within
a narrow range of filing dates and the history of their subsequent dis-
position or pendency recorded. At that time, only the period required
for disposition, by any means, of the median case-that is the case at
the middle of the range of elapsed time from filing to disposition-was
emphasized. A defect of the measurement was that, without existing
data for the prediction of results, what proved to be an excessive time
was allowed for most counties to reach their median case by the survey
date and a measurement which was taken in 1969 and published in 1970
was based on cases filed in the spring of 1966.24 Thus the published
results were outdated for planning purposes. The measurement was re-
peated in 1970 in those and other counties, using 1968 filings as a base
so that the data secured would have current value. The study showed
which results in a longer time span. The Institute also has accommodated them.
Finally, in 1970 and 1971, some courts have insisted on supplying statistics for all case
dispositions of record regardless of type, despite the fact that the Calendar Status
Studies are expressly stated to be only for personal injury cases.
This profusion of self declared and varying standards has reduced the value of the
Studies as uniform statistics with a common standard and a common meaning. Their
publication was suspended for the year 1972.
24. Umvaasrry oF AxKoR, supra note 19. The Institute of Court Management was
similarly handicapped in the Detroit study by the need to take samples filed in
1968 for a calendaring survey published in June 1971. See INsnrtur oF CouRT MANAG_-
¢MNT, ANALYsis oF CrviL CALENDAn NG PRocEDuRE oF an- Tumu JUDIcIAL Cmcurr 13
(1971).
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great variation in the median times for disposition. They ranged from
less than seven months in one county to 23 months in another.' This
type measurement was repeated, for tort cases and for all cases filed, in
connection with field studies for surveys of the court systems in Ten-
nessee, South Carolina, and Louisiana, by the Institute of Judicial Ad-
ministration. 26 Later, a similar procedure was undertaken in certain
selected counties in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Florida. A refine-
ment of the later studies was that, instead of seeking to determine the
time span of only the median case in any group of cases, the disposition
time for each 10 percent of the sample was not only noted, but the
results plotted in graph form so that the continuous progress of each
court in disposing of its cases could be shown visually. This also per-
mitted the establishment of a progress rate for each court and utiliza-
tion of more current docket samples, which could be taken without
regard to any fear that the median case might not be reached at the
time the measurement was made. This method of taking samples made
it possible to go back to the same court in subsequent years to follow
the progress of those cases still pending at the time of the initial meas-
urement, thereby enabling a continuous check on progress. In the case
of the Ohio courts, the follow-up on an older sample was made at
the same time a new sample was taken for a subsequent year, so that
the time taken to dispose of up to 90 percent or more of the prior
year's filings could be plotted on a graph.
The progress line as shown on the graphs was cumulative; it com-
prehended both elapsed time and the percentage of cases disposed of,
rising from a zero abscissa and ordinate toward a goal of 100 percent
dispositions in 24, 36, or 42 months. From such a graph, the average
disposition rate for any given period of time from the filing of the case
could be determined. Where the studies were made of the same court
for successive years, the comparison of results could be shown visually
by a series of progress lines for the various years. In order to simplify
25. The observed disposition times were stated in weeks, rather than months.
UIVERSITY OF AKRON, supra note 19, at 35-36.
26. The chartings were of all civil cases as included in the text of the report.
INsTITUTE OF JuDIcLAL ADMINISTRATION, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF SOUTH CAROLINA 37-38
(1971). Those for Richland County (Columbia) alone were for tort jury cases. Id.
at 41. Only the criminal case time span charts were shown in the text of the Tennessee
study. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE TENNESSEE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 47
(1971). Civil case and tort jury case chartings for 14 counties appeared in a limited
circulation appendix to the report. All time span charts on tort cases were omitted
from the Louisiana report text. The appendix, containing charts from nine parishes,
has not yet been published.
[Vol. 14:1
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reading, TABLE I shows the wandering progress lines as a straight line
to that point at which production levelled off, that is, at which little
further work was performed to dispose of the few remaining cases in
the sample.
TABLE I
ToRT DsposmoS-PORTAGE Courry, Omo-By YEAna
Thirty-three randomly selected cases each year, Production
time for each year averaged to point of production fall off.
One Two
100% 2 4 6 8 10 Year 14 16 18 20 22 Years 26 28 30





0 40% Or Average monthly prductio
- - Filing rate to point of fall off
30% 7.7%/ 1966 4.6%
20% 51967 .0%q1 1967 4.0%10% 1968 3.2%1969 2.9% incomplete
1970 2.0% incomplete
2 4 6 8 10 One 14 16 18 20 22 Two
Year Years
Months of Pendency From Filing to Point at Which Production
Levelled off or Until May 1, 1972, Whichever Occurred First.
Similar comparison graphs were also compiled showing the progress
of different courts in the same locality, of the same courts in different
types of cases, of comparable counties in the same state, and of counties
of comparable size and characteristics in different states. During the
course of the studies an increasing number of courts were measured
on the "time from filing to disposition" basis which were also periodi-
cally measured by the "time from issue to trial" method in the Calendar
Status Studies. A basis of correlation of the two results was established;
as earlier studies in Ohio had indicated, a correlation of results was estab-
lished between direct measurement and the "statistical delay" shown as
the quotient of terminated cases divided into still pending cases.2 7 It was
27. See UNIVERSITY OF AxKRON, supra note 19, at 12-13. The range of variance
between observed measurement and "statistical delay" is shown. Id. at 35-36. Use of this
quotient is also made in the unpublished report on Washington County, Pennsylvania,
by the Institute of Court Management.
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then possible to use the Calendar Status Studies' figures of some major
cities, checked by the statistical delay figures as published by state ad-
ministrators' reports and adjusted for the then-known characteristics of
the progress lines in that particular state, to plot the progress of cases
from filing to disposition without direct measurement.28 With this addi-
tional data, a composite progress line for an entire state could be plotted
as the median of the various times taken by representative courts of that
state at each 10 percentile of dispositions. The portrayal of the opera-
tions of an entire state trial court system cannot, of course, be as strictly
accurate as the simplified lines on TABLE II would represent it to be, but
the spread of times between different counties and parishes in the same
state proved to be amazingly small in comparison to the spread between
comparable counties in different states.
Single Court or Two-Level Trial Court
The most striking feature of the Conference's Consensus Statement
was its apparent abrupt departure from the American Bar Association's
(and Pound's) two-level trial court system. There is some reason to
doubt that the Conference really opposed the limited jurisdiction court
as much as it did the special jurisdiction court, and that the primary
purpose of the single court recommendation was to put all general juris-
diction level judges (regardless of their classification as chancellors,
circuit, criminal, probate, domestic relations, and juvenile judges) to
work trying criminal cases as an order of first priority. Nevertheless,
the statement did call for a single court, and the most tempting of the
performance comparisons is between the single court, the two-level
system, and the "catch as catch can" development in the as yet unre-
formed states. As to performance, the seven states studied in TABLE II
had examples of each system.
Of these states, Pennsylvania and Louisiana have, for practical pur-
poses, the single court system. Ohio and New Jersey have the two
level system, although they vary in the degree to which the minor
courts and their judges are integrated into the state system. The fully
integrated two court system has been recommended for Tennessee and
South Carolina and has been recently adopted, with a delayed effective
28. The lines based on calculations from Calendar Status Studies were used sparingly
since there is great possibility of deviation, as the Pittsburgh experience demonstrated.
ALLEGHENY COUNTY COMMON PL.as CotmR, supra note 21. In particular the figures
from Scranton (Lackawanna County), Pennsylvania, are at great variance from those
in the remainder of the state. Where a progress line or figure giving months of time
from filing to disposition is based on calculations from the Studies, that fact is stated.
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date, in Florida. Currently all three of these states operate under a
hodge-podge system which has many independent courts with over-
lapping and competing jurisdiction.
In theory, there is much to be said in favor of the uncluttered struc-
ture of the single court, which results in clean organizational charts.
Furthermore, lawyers are not subject to jurisdictional traps; there can
be no load imbalances between courts, and administration is simplified.
But the experience of Pennsylvania and Louisiana illustrates that dispatch
in the civil business of the courts, particularly the tort claims, is simply
not one of the virtues of this system. Philadelphia, even with the aid of
sending out many of its civil claims, including tort actions, for com-
pulsory arbitration, takes 47 months to dispose of the first two-thirds
of its tort (trespass) actions. The record in neighboring Norristown
is not appreciably better. Pittsburgh takes 22 months to dispose of half
of its tort claims and 23 months for the first two-thirds of them. Only
in Sdranton (which did not furnish data in 1971) does there appear to
be :dispatch, with five months indicated for disposition of the median
tort case and seven and a half months for two-thirds of them. 9
The record in Louisiana is somewhat better. There the two most
poptilous parishes, Orleans and Jefferson (metropolitan New Orleans)
both;had difficulty with timely dispositions, taking more than 35 and
30 months, respectively, to dispose of two-thirds of their tort cases.
But both parishes are among the Louisiana exceptions to the single
court principle; each has a separate juvenile court and each has a parish
(county)-wide system of limited jurisdiction civil and criminal courts
to assist the district court. Elsewhere in Louisiana the results, on a
time-in-process measurement, are somewhat better, ranging from six to
16 months for the disposition of the median case. But the disposition
of the balance of the tort cases was frequently long delayed, with
only one parish among those surveyed clearing two-thirds of its cases
within 10 months, and many taking much longer °0
The record in the two-level trial court states is even less impressive.
In Ohio, only Akron and Toledo, among the nine counties measured,
29. The material from Florida is primarily calculated, although spot measurements
were made in Jacksonville and Clearwater. At the time of construction of the com-
parative state graph only Philadelphia and Cumberland (Carlisle) counties had been
measured directly. Thereafter Allegheny, Washington, and Beaver counties were
measured and graphed. The poorer record of Allegheny would probably depress the
composite Pennsylvania progress line somewhat.
30. This slowing of disposition is more attributable to bar control of the calendaring
process than to structural deficiency. See pp. 36-38 infra.
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disposed of half of their tort cases in less than 10 months, and only
Akron and Youngstown accounted for disposition of two-thirds of such
cases in 15 months or less. Cleveland took more than 30 months and
Columbus more than 28 months to dispose of two-thirds of their tort
cases, and even small Medina County did not reach this disposition
level in less than 27 months. Productivity appears to be declining since
the 1968 structural or modern courts reform. The almost continuous
decline in one county, Portage, can be seen from the comparative graph
lines in TABLE I. The same general decline was noted in graphs for
Hamilton County (Cincinnati), Franklin (Columbus), Montgomery
(Dayton), Clark (Springfield), and others.
New Jersey, with many of its disposition times in major cities calcu-
lated from data furnished to the Calendar Status Studies, appears to be
even slower in its dispositions. Jersey City took more than 43 months
to dispose of two-thirds of its tort cases and in Newark, Elizabeth,
and Trenton the time span ranged from 32 to 35 months for two-thirds
dispositions.31 In some of the directly measured counties in South
Jersey, such as Atlantic, Cumberland, and Cape May, the picture was
considerably better; but in others, such as Middlesex (New Brunswick)
and Camden, the disposition rate was also poor, with median disposi-
tion times ranging from 20 to 27 months and two-thirds dispositions in
23 to 32 months.
The three states with fragmented structures and duplicating courts
of concurrent jurisdiction achieved the best results in the disposition
of tort cases. Most South Carolina circuit courts managed to dispose of
two-thirds of their tort cases in two years or less. 2 In Florida, where
there was much quiet doubt in some court circles as to the wisdom of
court consolidation, the comment was heard, "It won't move a single
case one bit faster." This is probably true, so far as tort cases are con-
cerned. In four of the six most populous counties of the state, where
congestion is most apt to occur, two-thirds of the tort cases are dis-
posed of in less than 18 months. In Jacksonville, the two-thirds dispo-
sition level is reached, on a calculated rather than a measured basis, in
less than six months.
But it is Tennessee, with the most complicated and bewildering court
structure in the region if not the nation, which demonstrates the most
31. Progress in these four counties was not measured directly but calculated from
Calendar Status Studies.
-32. Only three of the four largest counties could be measured directly due to the
condition of the records. In all but two of the smaller counties the results are suspect
for the same reason.
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dispatch in tort cases. In addition to the traditional circuit court sys-
tem, the state has separate chancery courts, separate law and equity
courts, and separate criminal courts. Some limited jurisdiction courts
not of record decide divorce and workman's compensation cases. Con-
current jurisdiction abounds. Yet in not one of the state's five largest
counties does it take as long as 10 months to dispose of two-thirds of
the tort cases, and the median case disposition takes five to six months.8 3
Only in a few of the smaller counties, some of which are gathered into
absurdly large circuits, does it take longer than 16 months to dispose
of two-thirds of the tort cases filed. It might be assumed that such a
high performance record was achieved by shunting the more trouble-
some and time consuming cases to some other court of concurrent
jurisdiction, such as the separate chancery courts. This assumption is
mistaken. Not only does chancery not have jurisdiction of such cases,
but the caseload of the Tennessee circuits is comparatively high, both
in relation to the chancery courts and to the superior trial courts of
other states. The time spans for the metropolitan chancery courts are
quite comparable to those of the circuits, as TABLE III shows:
TABLE III
MOXTHS OF PENDF Cy FROM FILING TO Disposmtiort
One Two
ifn0 / 2 4 6 8 10 Year 14 16 18 20 22 Years 26 28
80% - Comparative time perform-
ance of Chancery and
70% 0Circuit Courts, Hamilton




30% -- Chancery Court
20%--Circuit (All Cases)
10--% Circuit (Jury Cases)
2 4 6 8 10 One 14 16 18 20 22 Two
Year Years
Months of Pendency From Filing to Disposition
33. All the time data from Tennessee is from filing year 1969. No year-to-year com-
parisons were made.
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The Judges: Numbers, Allocation, and Selection
A second area of comparison suggested by the Consensus Statement,
although there is no conflict between it and the American Bar's Model
Judicial Article, is in the area of judicial power and in the attainment
of high quality judges by adequate provision for pay and tenure.
Ideally, an adequate number of judges, well paid and secure in tenure,
should be able to perform better, both qualitatively and quantitatively,
than those who must scramble for election for short terms or must
"moonlight" to supplement meager judicial salaries. The question is:
Do they?
Of the seven states compared in quantitative performance, all but
one have a similar ratio of judges to population. Tennessee and Lou-
isiana each have one judge for slightly less than 40,000 persons, al-
though the former has a greater supply of full time limited jurisdiction
judges to assist with small claims, traffic, and probate matters. Ohio,
New Jersey, and Florida have approximately one judge per 50,000
persons, although both Florida's and New Jersey's ratios are better
when the criminal court of record judges in the former, and the trans-
ferable county judges in the latter are taken into account. Pennsyl-
vania's judge power, statewide, was formerly rated at one to 70,000
persons, but recent additions to the Philadelphia bench and the use of
municipal judges for many felony trials makes the local judicial ratio
approximately 1:27,000. Recent increases in the number of judges in
other areas, notably Pittsburgh, indicate a ratio of somewhat less than
one judge for each 50,000 persons, and the use of compulsory arbitration
brings a further addition of part time arbiters as judicial equivalents so
that Pennsylvania is comparable to other states.
Of the seven states, only the South Carolina judiciary appears to be
grossly under staffed. It has 16 circuit judges for a 2,600,000 popu-
lation, for a ratio of one judge for 162,000 persons, and even when,
as in Florida, the nine limited jurisdiction county judges who have
extensive civil and criminal jurisdiction are taken into consideration,
it still has only one judge for each 100,000 of population.
Generally speaking, the relative numbers of judges a state maintains
does not correspond to the differences in tort case disposition times. 4
The overworked South Carolina judges outperform their Ohio, Penn-
34. Tennessee, which has one of the most plentiful supplies of judges and the fastest
record of dispositions, is an exception to this general statement. However, even in
Tennessee the correspondence between the number of judges and the quick disposition
of cases cannot be extended to other areas.
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sylvania, and New Jersey counterparts by a wide margin, as do
their more plentifully supplied Florida colleagues. But the same pro-
portion of available judges is not allocated to civil matters in each state,
and differences in the proportion of judges allocated to civil matters
may affect the true ratio of judges to population as far as tort cases are
concerned. This is true not only in different states but in different
counties and parishes within the same state. The general duty judges
in Ohio,85 Pennsylvania, New Jersey, most of Louisiana, and parts of
Florida allocate their numbers between civil and criminal duties in
accordance with need, although tradition plays some part. In South
Carolina the legislature, by determining the number and duration of
civil (Common Pleas) and criminal (General Sessions) terms of court
in each county, makes the allocation of judge power, which is heavily
weighted on the criminal side. In heavily populated areas of Tennessee,
in New Orleans, and in the larger metropolitan areas in Florida, sep-
arate criminal courts of virtually equal status with the general jurisdic-
tion courts have been created, with the number of judges performing
civil and criminal duties mandated by the legislature or by constitutional
provision. The proportion of trial judges actually available for civil
work thus varied from approximately 80 percent of total bench strength
in some Ohio counties and some Florida metropolitan centers, through
70 percent in much of Tennessee, to approximately two-thirds in much
of Ohio and Louisiana. But in New Orleans, and recently in Phila-
delphia, more than half the bench strength is allocated to the criminal
court. Such a disproportionate allotment of judicial talent to the tort
cases may partially account for the relatively poor showing of the
particular counties involved. On the other hand, the large percentage
of judges devoted to civil matters may account for much of the speedy
disposition of tort cases made by the Tennessee metropolitan courts
and by Jacksonville, Florida.
In the selection of judges there is less variety among the states. Of
the seven states studied, only New Jersey, where appointment for long
35. Prior to 1970, the traditional division of responsibility in Ohio multi-judge courts
was for one judge (six in Cleveland) to be assigned to criminal cases. The remainder of
the bench was assigned to civil matters. This gave Summit County (Akron) an 84 per-
cent distribution in favor of civil matters, Stark County (Canton) and Mahoning
(Youngstown) each 75 percent, and Cuyahoga (Cleveland) 76 percent. All increased
their allotment of judges to the criminal division in 1970. In 1972, the criminal divisions




terms prevails, approximates the Missouri plan of selection. South Caro-
lina uses legislative election, but for terms of only four years. In both
states, tenure is relatively secure. Popular election is the rule in the other
five states; appointment is used only to fill unexpired terms, and, in
Tennessee and Florida, to fill newly created judicial positions. The
Pennsylvania terms are for 10 years, the others for eight and six years.
Election is normally by partisan ballot, but Ohio follows the curious
practice of requiring nomination in party primaries, followed by "non-
partisan" balloting in the general election, a practice which fools no one.
Selection and tenure provisions seem to have little effect on the
dispatch of tort cases. The state with the most ideal selection pro-
cedure, New Jersey, has one of the worst disposition records. Pennsyl-
vania, the state with the next longest terms of office, is also low in
productivity. Furthermore, in those states such as Tennessee, Louisiana,
and Florida, where judges must devote much time to being reelected,
the disposition record is relatively superior.
The adequacy of judicial pay is scarcely an item for comparison
among the states measured. Except in Tennessee, where a constitutional
provision forbids acceptance of recent pay raises until the end of a
judge's eight-year term; in a few rural and sparsely populated counties
in Ohio; and among the county judges of New Jersey, who do Superior
Court work for less pay, the salaries have become adequate in recent
years. Oddly enough, it is the Tennessee judges, with the lowest pay,
who accomplish the most in terms of dispatch of their litigation.
Comparisons between the states regarding the discipline of judges-
that is, removal or compulsory retirement for physical, mental, or ethical
infirmity-cannot be made because too few of the states have had dis-
ciplinary provisions until recently. However, it may be noted that
New Jersey, Louisiana, and South Carolina have had such provisions
for many years. Tennessee still attempts to nudge judges into retire-
ment by adding bonuses to the regular retirement provisions. Ohio has
adopted its age 70-76 provision for mandatory retirement so recently
that two judges who ran successfully for another term of office shortly
after the adoption of a constitutional provision prohibiting such con-
duct are still in office. As a result, the general duty judges of one
county average over 70 years of age, with one judge still sitting at age
82.86 In Louisiana and Pennsylvania, by contrast, a number of judges
36. The correlation of the age of judges with the speed of disposition of tort cases
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have retired voluntarily, and then have accepted recall to active duty
as senior or retired judges for the express purpose of adding needed
bench strength in their particular localities.
Administration-Parajudicial Talent
The use of persons other than judges to administer the courts has
been a goal of court reformers and modernizers for more than 30
years, particularly since Roscoe Pound so convincingly stated the case
for separate administration.8 7 Originally, the term administration com-
prehended only the personnel, purchasing, budgeting, and other pri-
marily fiscal areas of the courts and their relationship to other depart-
ments of government. Necessarily it included the business of lobbying
with the appropriating power for an adequate judicial budget.
At a later time, the movement for use of parajudicial talent was gen-
erated in another area of the administration of justice. This was in sup-
plying the judges with law clerks to aid them in substantive research,
thus improving the quality of judicial decisions. For a long time, the
two uses of outside talent were distinct: One was concerned with non-
decisional matters and enjoyment of a degree of independent responsi-
bility; the other was concerned with specific decisions but in a subordi-
nate, controlled role. It is the federal courts, rather than the state trial
courts, which have most utilized parajudicial talent in the decision assist-
ing role, although some state trial courts have tried the parallel solution
of using legally trained but non-judicial referees and master commis-
sioners for routine decisional matters.
But in between these two sub-fields, there has developed a third:
that of controlling and managing case flow, calendar management, and
the actual scheduling of cases for trial. This is the field of the assign-
in this county is shown in the following table:
Filing Average Age Time Required Average Disposition
Year of Judges to Dispose of Rate pei Month
Median Tort Case
1961 59 6 Y Months 7.7%
1966 61 8 Months 4.6%
1967 62 6 Months 5.0%
1968 63 14 Months 4.0%
1969 70 11 Months 3.2%
1970 71 17'Y Months 2.9%
1971 72 Not reached 2.0.
37. R. Pou-D, supra note 11. The abridgment, Principles and Outlines of a Modern
Unified Court Organization, has been reprinted from Junicu taz in pamphlet forin.
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ment commissioner or assignment clerk who, in the larger courts, con-
trolled which judge would. hear which case, and who had, for a
principal duty, the removal of scheduling conflicts, among the trial bar
so that the Same attorney would not be due to appear simultaneously
before two or more judges in two or more different cases.
When Pound and the American Bar Association's Section on Judi-
cial Administration spoke of judicial administration and the use of para-
judicial talent, their remarks were addressed primarily to the first of
these three functions. Considering the developments in intervening
years, it seems likely that when the Consensus spoke of the use of para-
judicial talent and of administration in almost the same breath, the
concept embraced a combination of all three roles: the peripheral per-
sonnel and fiscal matters, the decisional aid, and the case flow manage-
ment,
There can be no quarrel with the first of these uses of outside talent.
Relieving the judges of the personnel problems, with their attendant
patronage concerns, is by now an accepted solution to the problem of
efficient use of judge power. On the state level, similar relief is pro-
vided for the Chief Justice, thus obviating the need for appearances
before legislative appropriation committees. In addition the state court
administrator collects statistics on local court operations so that he can
advise the Chief Justice of the need for assignment of judges to relieve
congestion in some geographical areas, make recommendations con-
cerning the creation of additional judgeships, and channel complaints
concerning judges and the administration of justice to the proper agen-
cies. The second function, the use of parajudicial talent as an aid to
decision-making, is less generally accepted. There is some fear that the
bright young recent law school graduates will become the deciders,
not merely the aids to decision, in the state trial courts. This is perhaps
the chief reason that law clerkships generally are confined to the fed-
eral trial and the state appellate courts, and that the trial courts at the
state level generally have made use of referees and master commissioners,
using older, if less inspired, men. But since such decisional aid only
remotely affects the adjudication speed in tort trial to jury matters, it
is not a major item for analysis here. "
" it is in the third area, that of case flow management, that there is
the greatest variety in the use of non-judicial talent among the states
compared, and the greatest opportunity to test the contribution of the
professional case flow manager to the dispatch of tort cases. Assign-
ment commissioners are used in some states not only in metropolitan
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areas of a million or more population, but also in semi-urbanized areas
containing two judges and 100,000 persons. Their use is avoided in areas
of 750,000 persons and 18 to 20 judges of the same court.
New Jersey leads the list of states having such local administrators.
Eleven of its 21 counties have such an officer, who sometimes has super-
vision over a nearby county without an administrator. While the New
Jersey judges are transferred rather freely from area to area and from
court level to court level in the same area, the court administrator is
an official with a fixed place of business and a single responsibility to
a local court or group of courts.
Ohio probably ranks a close second to New Jersey in the percentage
of administered courts, and since it has more counties it undoubtedly
has more court administrators, although in many cases their area of
activity is confined strictly to the case flow field while the New Jersey
administrators have additional concerns. Cleveland has a large staff of
assignment commissioners for managing the civil calendar, headed by
a professional court administrator and supervised by a local chief
justice who spends much of his time as the local court executive.
Akron and Youngstown have had calendar administrators (assignment
commissioners) for many years, while Canton and Warren have had
them for shorter periods. Cincinnati, which did without for years, is
currently obtaining a calendar administrator. Even Portage County
(population 125,000 and two general duty judges) has had an assign-
ment commissioner since 1964 and a Bureau of Support for expediting
the flow of alimony and reciprocal support cases since 1968.
In Pennsylvania, only Philadelphia and Pittsburgh have non-judicial
administrative staffs headed by professional court administrators!"
These cities have thoroughly computerized calendaring and record
keeping machinery. However, the machinery is used principally for
the criminal side of the Philadelphia court's work; the civil side still
maintains handwork dockets and records, operating from the office of
the prothonotary. Much of the calendaring of civil cases in Philadel-
phia and in Pittsburgh is done by specialized judges.
In all the southern and border states which were studied, there are
only three local court administrators, all of recent vintage. Jefferson
Parish (metropolitan New Orleans) has one who is, like the Philadel-
phia staff, primarily a criminal case coordinator with computer aids.
Baton Rouge has recently acquired a full time administrator with au-
38. Other counties, notably Washington, have a person with the title of administra-
tor, but the title covers a multitude of other duties, such as acting as pretrial master.
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thority over both civil and criminal operations and Shreveport is
moving in this direction by upgrading the functions of its chief minute
clerk. In Florida, Miami (Dade County) has elected to use non-judi-
cial talent for court administration duties, but so recently that the
manager has not acquired a suitable tide. In the rest of the South,
there is no local administrator-not even for Memphis (18 judges not
including probate), New Orleans (23 judges), Nashville (13 judges),
or Jacksonville (16 judges). Administration in those counties is handled
by the clerks and a committee of judges.
It might be tempting to make statewide comparisons on the appar-
ent effect of administrators on the case flow of tort cases. Certainly
New Jersey and Ohio, with their abundance of local managers, would
show to poor advantage in any such comparison; Tennessee and Florida
would appear to furnish fuel for the argument that in the Jeffersonian
sense those courts which are least administered are best administered.
But such a broad comparison would be unfair to some individual cities.
A better test would be to compare the records of individual communi-
ties with local administrators to comparatively populated communities
which do not have administrators.
Among the most populous counties surveyed, Philadelphia, Pitts-
burgh, Cleveland, Newark, and Jersey City have had long experience
with local administrators; the Miami and Cincinnati experiences have
been brief and are not reflected in the time span studies; Memphis and
New Orleans have had no experience at all. The disposition rate in the
administered counties is as follows:
Philadelphia-30 months for the median case; more than 40 months
for the first two-thirds of dispositions.
Cleveland-21 months for the median case; 36 months for the first
two-thirds.
Pittsburgh-22 months for the median case; 36 months for the first
two-thirds.
Jersey City-23.9 months for the median case; 42.7 months for the
first two-thirds.
Newark-22 months for the median case; 34.7 months for the first
two-thirds.
For the unadministered counties:
Memphis-5.8 months for the median case; 8.7 months for the first
two-thirds.
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Miami-9.1 months for the median case; 13.6 months for the first
two-thirds.
New Orleans-26 months for the median case; more than 35 months
for the first two-thirds.8 9
Admittedly, as previously noted, Memphis has more judges on the
civil side and New Orleans has fewer. Even so, New Orleans ap-
proached the record of the best of the administered courts, and Mem-
phis and Miami completely outclassed them.
In a second group of cities and counties, those with populations
from 300,000 to 600,000, the comparative results are less striking.
Akron and Youngstown, Ohio, have administrators, as do Camden and
New Brunswick, New Jersey. Gretna (Jefferson Parish), Louisiana,
has partial and recent administration. The remaining counties in this
measured group do not. The record for the administered counties is
as follows:
Akron-8.9 months for the median case; 15 months for two-thirds.
Youngstown-13 months for the median; 15.5 months for two-thirds;
94 percent dispositions in 21 months.
New Brunswick-19 months for the median case; 22 months for two-
thirds dispositions.
Camden-27 months for the median case; 32 months for two-thirds.
Gretna-19.1 months for the median case; more than 30 months for
two-thirds.
For the unadministered counties:
Norristown, Pa.-15 months for the median; 37 months for two-
thirds. 40
Nashville-6.6 months for the median; 9.5 months for two-thirds.
Jacksonville-3.0 months for the median case; 5.6 months for two-
thirds.
Clearwater-St. Petersburg, Fla.-8.6 months for the median case; 11
months for two-thirds.
Although the two administered Ohio counties do quite well in dispo-
sitions and one unadministered county in Pennsylvania rather poorly,
39. The times for Newark, Jersey City, and Miami are calculated from Calendar
Status Studies; the remainder are measured directly.




elsewhere the clear superiority in dispositional speed appears to lie
with those jurisdictions in which the judges themselves administer the
calendars and trial settings.
In counties in the 200,000 to 300,000 population class, the results
are even clearer. Warren, Ohio and Trenton, New Jersey have court
administrators. Charleston and Columbia, South Carolina, Knoxville
and Chattanooga, Tennessee, Shreveport, Louisiana, and Scranton, Penn-
sylvania do not have administrators. The results from administered
counties:
Warren-24 months for the median case; 32 months for two-thirds. 41
Trenton-18 months for the median case; 32.4 months for two-thirds.
For the unadministered counties:
Scranton-5 months for the median case; 7.4 months for two-thirds.
Charleston-13 months for the median case; more than 20 months for
two-thirds.
Columbia-19 months for the median case; 22.6 months for two-thirds.
Knoxville-6 months for the median case; 8.3 months for two-thirds.
Chattanooga-6 months for the median; 6.7 months for two-thirds.
Except for the two South Carolina counties which, as previously
noted, are grossly under judged and overly concerned with the crimi-
nal docket, the advantage in dispatch of tort cases lies very clearly
with the unadministered counties.
The final comparison, in counties in the 100,000 to 200,000 popula-
tion class, shows only one county measured in the administered classi-
fication. This was Portage County, Ohio, which also had the prob-
lems of an overaged bench and the troubles arising from the Kent State
University shootings during the period of the survey.42 Because of
these factors, fairness dictates that the years before 1969 (when bench
age changed seriously) and 1970 (when the Kent State troubles
erupted) be considered. The results, by filing years, in Portage County:
41. The times for Trenton and Scranton are calculated; the others are measured
directly.
42. As a collateral matter, the readiness of the judges of this county to charge all
operational deficiencies to the '"Kent State cases," although many deficiencies antedated
the shootings by more than a year, led to an unanticipated comparison survey in
another troubled area. The Yablonski murder cases have occupied much public atten-
tion and much judicial time in Washington County, Pennsylvania. Tort case disposi-
tion there was measured on a successive year basis in April, 1972. Median disposition
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Median case Disposition of two-
Filing year disposition thirds of tort cases
1966 7.2 months 8.6 months
1967 8.2 months 12.4 months
1968 14.0 months 19.6 months
1969 11.2 months 14.5 months
1970 17.3 months 23.0 months
1971 Not reached 5/1/72 Not reached
From the unadministered counties:
Kingsport-Bristol (Sullivan County), Tenn.-Median case in 5.3
months; two-thirds dispositions in 6 months.
Carlisle, Pa.-Median case disposition in 15 months; two-thirds dispo-
sitions in 20 months.
Anderson, S. C.-Median case disposition in 10.1 months; two-thirds
dispositions not reached in 14 months.
Lake Charles, La.-Median case disposition in 7.8 months; two-thirds
dispositions in 9.7 months.
Alexandria, La.-Median case disposition in 6 months; two-thirds dis-
positions in 14 months.
It would be premature to assume that non-judicial administration, in
and of itself, actually inhibits the dispatch of litigation, or as some wag
put it: "Administrators don't cure delay; they're part of the problem
of delay." Without consideration of the effects of various devices to
speed disposition which are hereafter discussed, such as file review, pre-
trial disclosures, discovery cutoffs, and sophisticated trial setting tech-
niques, this conclusion would be manifestly unfair to a dedicated group
of administrators, some of whom are quite talented and most of whom
are hard-working. Because of their staffs, it may be that the judges in
the administered courts have been reluctant to experiment with some
of the imaginative techniques in docket movement practiced elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the administrators themselves may have much to answer
for in not apprising themselves of these techniques and in not persuad-
ing their judges to adopt them.
time for the filing year 1962 was almost three years; that for filing year 1969 was less
than 17 months. For filing year 1970, the median case took 18 z months, but the fall-off




The three items discussed above were the only areas in which the
National Conference and its Consensus Statement took a strong posi-
tion in matters regarding the civil process. In only one area, that
of the so-called single court, was the Conference's approach basically
different from previous approaches and earlier thought. But there are
many areas in which the Consensus Statement took a strong position on
the criminal process, while similar problems on the civil side of the
courts' docket were ignored completely. Although the statement men-
tioned the Pound idea of specialized departments for handling particu-
lar kinds of litigation within the single court, the Conference appears to
have rejected this concept. The tenor of its statements on the powers
needed by the trial court in dealing with counsel for the criminal de-
fendant gives rise to the suspicion that the Conference would have
judges devote all of their talents to the criminal arena, thus suggesting
that the individual judge's docket system of calendaring cases, which
makes all judges generalists and destroys specialized departments, should
be utilized.
In order to determine the validity of the Consensus Statement, it will
be helpful to compare the results of various calendaring systems, meth-
ods of docket control, and the ramifications of pretrial procedures.
Calendaring Systems
Court reformers suggest two systems for placing cases on the trial
list and assigning them to judges in multi-judge courts. The first, or
master calendar system, assigns each stage of all cases to a specialist
judge in that particular stage: pretrial motions to a motion room, dis-
covery problems to a special room, trial assignments to a calendar con-
trol room, non-jury cases to an equity room, other civil cases to jury
trial rooms, criminal cases to a criminal division, and so on. The advan-
tages claimed for master calendaring are those of production-line effi-
ciency. With each judge an expert in a limited field, the advantages
are thought to be better and more uniform craftsmanship, less dead
time in scheduling since each case ready for trial is shuttled into the
first available trial room, and a minimizing of the situation where an
attorney has conflicting court dates.
The second system, the individual judge's docket, assigns each case
'to a particular judge for handling the entire case, including trial itself.
The focus is on the responsibility of the individual judge for the dis-
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position of his assigned case. This has the advantage of encouraging
competition among judges, each judge trying to dispose of the most
cases in a given period of time. Another advantage is that the need for
more than one judge to familiarize himself with the issues in a single
case is eliminated. It is also claimed that the buck-passing involved in
continuing cases, which results when a judge passes on particularly
thorny problems to another judge, is eliminated.
Originally, the individual judge's docket was conceived of as a device
for use in civil jury cases only. Criminal, probate, matrimonial, juvenile,
and equity cases were to be handled by a different set of specialist
judges, in accordance with the Pound prescription. But in recent years
there has been a tendency to consider the system applicable to all cases
filed in a given court. This would require a jurisdiction to give up
divisionalizing the courts. Thus, the modified system calls for an equal
mix of jury, equity, probate, domestic relations, criminal, and all other
types of cases in each judge's courtroom. The federal courts, which
have considerably less variety in the types of cases filed, have been the
leaders in the extension, or distortion, of this system. Louisiana and
Ohio also have adopted it. The tendency of such an extension is not
only to require a single court, but to eliminate any specialized divisions.
The purpose is to distribute criminal cases among all judges, regardless
of their training, their field of expertise, or their personal preference.
Thus, all judges are considered generalists and the specialist divisions of
the court are considered a thing of the past.
The result is that the opportunity to measure quantitative results of
the two opposing systems is lost, for there is no clearly opposed pair of
systems; the individual judge's docket means different things to different
people in different jurisdictions. In Ohio, prior to the 1972 Rules of
Superintendence, it meant a single judge dealing with a mix of jury
and equity cases, but usually not domestic relations or criminal matters.
In Tennessee it meant civil jury and sometimes matrimonial cases, but
not criminal or equity matters. In parts of Florida, it meant civil jury,
equity, and sometimes criminal matters, but not probate or juvenile
cases. In Louisiana, it usually meant civil jury and non-jury cases,
sometimes criminal cases, and often domestic relations, probate, and
juvenile cases as well. In addition there has been a difference of opin-
ion as to the point in time at which the cases should be assigned, normally
by lot, to a particular judge. In most of Louisiana, Tennessee, and re-
cently in Ohio, the allotment is made at the time of the filing of the
case. Elsewhere a case may be assigned only after pleading issue is
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reached, or only when a certificate of readiness for trial is filed. Some-
times the process is reversed, and a case will be assigned to a judge
until it is ready for trial, and then go on the master calendar.
The two systems may be compared in terms of speed of disposition.
The master calendar system could well be compared to the production
line methods initiated by Henry Ford, the individual judge's docket to
the painstaking craftsmanship of a Raphael or a Rembrandt. In any
contest based on speed and quantity production, Henry Ford should
win by a wide margin. This is the view taken by most professional
court administrators, and it has been most disturbing to them that many
federal judges have claimed that shifting from master control to the
individual judge's docket has speeded up case flow immensely. No long-
term studies of the sort outlined above have been conducted in the fed-
eral courts and it may be assumed that part of the speed-up effect of
the shift is attributable to the short range effect of any change of system
in which an inventory of work in process is taken first. How much of
the speed-up in the United States District Courts may be of only short
range effectiveness in cleaning out deadwood on the docket is conjec-
tural. However, the longer range studies conducted in connection with
the individual state surveys may throw some light on this inventory
effect.
Among the states compared, New Jersey and Pennsylvania can be
considered master calendar jurisdictions. Tennessee and Louisiana, as well
as most of Florida, use the individual judge's docket. During the period
for which measurements were made, Ohio was divided on a county
option basis with some courts following each system. South Carolina,
with its series of one-judge circuits, could be considered as an individual
judge's docket state except that its system of rotating judges from cir-
cuit to circuit every four months produces many of the effects of a
master calendar system.
On a highly simplistic basis, a time performance comparison between
the states can be made. Since Tennessee, Florida, and Louisiana have
shorter time spans for disposition of their tort cases than New Jer-
sey and Pennsylvania, the individual judge's docket system must be
clearly superior and the judicial Raphaels must be better performers
than the judicial Henry Fords. But such a statewide comparison elim-
inates consideration of the varying effects of the two systems in the
Ohio counties; it leaves out of consideration South Carolina, whose
system is an unwieldly combination of both, and it does not consider
differences in the time of allotment of cases to the judges in parts of
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Louisiana and Florida. Most of all, a statewide comparison ignores
questions such as the size of the courts which use each system and the
varying degrees of success which each system achieves. Therefore, a
county-by-county comparison, with emphasis on the Ohio counties, will
be helpful in order to draw conclusions regarding the two calendaring
systems.
The most successful users of the individual judge's docket system
(Memphis, Knoxville, and Chattanooga, Tennessee; Jacksonville, Flor-
ida; and Lake Charles and Baton Rouge, Louisiana) have used it only
for damage claims and the jury eligible cases. In Knoxville the Circuit
Court is primarily a civil jury court; equity matters go to the separate
chancery courts, while criminal cases go to a separate criminal court,
and domestic relations cases go to a separate division, denominated as
a separate circuit court. Memphis and Chattanooga include domestic
relations matters in their allotments to the circuit judges. Jacksonville
includes equity matters as well. Baton Rouge and Lake Charles, by
divisioning and the use of separate courts, exclude domestic relations,
criminal, and juvenile matters from the mix of cases allotted. Most of
the Florida metropolitan courts and the Tennessee courts also exclude
such cases. The less successful of the individual judge's docket courts do
not screen out as much of the specialized matters; but like the federal
courts, they place all cases, frequently including criminal cases, into a
pool for allotment.
Even including these variations, the record of the individual judge's
docket courts is speedy by comparison with all but a few of the master
calendar arrangements in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. There, only
the smaller counties (Cumberland, Cape May, and Atlantic in New
Jersey, and Cumberland and Lackawanna in Pennsylvania) have made
headway in the expeditious disposition of tort claims. But the apparent
heavy advantage of the Florida, Tennessee, and Louisiana courts may
well be due to other, previously discussed, differences between the
systems.
The record between the two systems among the Ohio counties be-
fore the enforced change in 1972 to the individual judge's docket is
almost neutral. Among the counties studied, Cleveland, Akron, and
Portage (to a degree) used the master control system; Cincinnati, Day-
ton, Youngstown, Warren, and Springfield (Clark County) were on
individual judge's docket, although most did not extend it to criminal
cases. Akron and Youngstown, using different systems, achieved equally
good results. The results in Cleveland and Warren were equally poor.
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Cincinnati, Dayton, and Clark County, on individual judge's docket
and Portage County, on master calendar, had disposition times that
were fair to poor. Each showed a constantly declining production rate
over a four to six year period. Such a side-by-side comparison cannot
be carried to extremes and perhaps the fairest conclusion is that, when
extraneous factors are removed, neither system shows clear superiority
over the other.
But Ohio also offered a before and after comparison. In 1971,
Columbus, which had been performing indifferently under the master
calendar system, shifted to the individual judge's docket system with
great expectations of expediting case flow. Nothing of the sort occurred.
At the time of the changeover, the necessary inventory of cases re-
vealed that some aged cases should have been disposed of long ago.
They were eliminated. There was also a brief spurt of activity in dis-
posing of some of the cases filed in the spring of 1970, but apart from
this the 1968 cases still left pending in 1971 were soon being disposed
of at a slower rate than were the 1966 cases two years earlier under
the master calendar system, and the time span of the. median Of the
1970 cases was somewhat longer than either the 1966 or the, 1968
samples had been under the master calendar system. Detls of the
Columbus experience are shown in graph form in TABLE IV.
Since the enforced changeover from master calendar to individual
judge's docket occurred statewide as recently as January 1, 1972, and
involved, of the Ohio counties studied, only Cleveland, Akron, and
Portage County, information on any decrease in disposition time result-
ing from the change is limited to its effect on samples of cases com-
menced well before the changeover date. In Akron the changeover
resulted in a diminution of the disposition rate in both the 1970 and
1971 samples, although there had been, immediately prior to January
1, 1972, a high disposition rate which may have been an advance effect
of the inventory taking process. In Cleveland the changeover caused
no change in disposition rate in the 1970 samples, which at that time
experienced the low rate of one percent per month for three months
before and after the changeover. A sharp increase in the disposition rate
of the 1971 cases spent itself after approximately two months, and by
April 1, 1972, the 1971 cases were being handled at the old rate. In
Portage, there was an increase in rate of disposition in one sample of
1970 cases and in the 1971 sample, but this lasted only one month after
the changeover 'date, when the rate subsided to less than its former rate
under master calendar control. In a second 1970 group, whose'cases
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Effect of Changeover from Master Calendar to Individual
Judge's Docket on case disposition for various filing years
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were approaching 24 months of pendency at changeover time, there
was a two month spurt of activity before January 1, apparently pro-
duced by the initial inventory process. After January 1, the produc-
don rate in this group of cases also fell below the pre-inventory rate.
The controversy over the relative superiority of the two systems of
calendaring raises one additional question: Is there a point at which
the individual judge's docket system, with each judge competing for
the attention and attendance of a limited trial bar, will break down due
to attorney conflicts in the larger courts, particularly where there is a
federal district court likewise competing for the attention of the bar?
It would logically seem so, but little research has been done on this
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point. Jacksonville manages with 20 judges, but 13 of them are almost
exclusively civil judges, three exclusively criminal in their workload,
and four handle juvenile matters. Consequently, they tend to attract
different specialized bars. Memphis uses the system successfully with
18 judges, but here again the bench is divided into separate general
civil, equity, and criminal courts. (Two probate judges were not con-
sidered in the total.) New Orleans with 23 judges, evenly divided into
separate civil, criminal, and juvenile courts, has a highly unsatisfactory
disposition rate. Philadelphia, which abandoned the master calendar
system a year ago and has since practiced a system of late allotment to
individual judges, has experienced a marked decline in judicial produc-
tivity, particularly after more than 40 judges began competing, in Jan-
uary, 1972, for the attendance of a limited trial bar. The limited docket
study performed there tended to confirm the administrators' estimates,
just as the Columbus study did. Philadelphia abandoned the new
arrangement and returned to master calendar control in July, 1972,
joining Pittsburgh, which claims considerable success in the last few
years in reducing the time span of its civil cases.4  In Cleveland the
shift in systems was required by the Ohio Supreme Court. It was more
drastic and embraced criminal cases, which has resulted in confusion
because the local sheriff has to conduct his prisoners long distances to
three different courthouses to find the 26 judges among whom his
criminal defendants are allotted, in addition to the six federal judges,
who also recently changed from master calendar to individual judge's
docket and use the sheriff as their custodian. Since two of the three
Cleveland courthouses have virtually no security arrangements, the
burden of policing the courtrooms is tremendous.
On the basis of a very limited experience and study, it would seem
that the maximum number of judges in any court, and in any city,
which can be accommodated successfully to the individual judge's
docket system, due to the engaged counsel rules, is somewhere around
20. After that number is reached, the problem of resolving attorney
conflicts appears to be great enough to impair the efficiency of the
system. Systems which function well in Portland and Jacksonville
could well be a spectacular failure in Philadelphia, Cleveland, or any
city of comparable size, particularly if it is also the seat of a federal
district court.
It is unfortunate that, in the verbal battle between the Raphaelite in-
dividual calendarists and the Henry Ford master calendarists, little at-
43. For the substance of this claim, see supra note 21.
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tention has been paid to a small group of courts which have combined
successfully the sense of responsibility of the one with the specialization
of the other. Several cities have succeeded in divisioning their courts
either formally or informally so that criminal, probate, juvenile, and
domestic relations cases are assigned to specialist judges, leaving only
the tort, contract, and miscellaneous cases to be allotted among the
general duty judges.44 The same effect has been achieved in other
cities by creating specialist courts. 45 Collectively these courts, follow-
ing the Pound prescription46 and using the individual judge's docket
only for a fraction of their total case load, have achieved by far the
best dispositional time in the tort case field."
Control of the Calendar
Related to the discussion of the relative merits of the calendaring
systems is the question of who controls them. There are basically
three agencies, regardless of the type of system: the judges, the admin-
istrators, and the practicing bar. In Tennessee, judicial control of the
calendaring process is common in the single county metropolitan cir-
cuits. Each judge "sounds" and "sets" his own docket as a matter of
personal responsibility, not delegated even to his secretary. In the
smaller communities which are visited infrequently by the judges be-
cause they are grouped into large, multi-county circuits, the bar has
much more influence. This may be one of the principal reasons why,
unlike most states, Tennessee experiences little dispositional delay in
its metropolitan areas but does have this problem in some of its rural
communities. In Florida, the judges are also firmly in control of the
calendaring and trial assignment process, and since most metropolitan
counties are bracketed with one or more adjacent rural counties, the
difficulties of non-metropolitan delay are less manifest.
In New Jersey and in parts of Pennsylvania and Ohio, the calendaring
and trial scheduling is controlled by parajudicial talent, the adminis-
44. These cities include Lake Charles and Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Washington,
Pennsylvania; and Youngstown, Ohio.
45. Most of the courts in Tennessee and Florida use specialist courts.
46. See note 11 supra.
47. In some instances, the dispatch of tort case business was accompanied by delay
in a clogged criminal docket. Memphis and Chattanooga, but not Knoxville or Nash-
ville, had serious delays in the criminal process in 1969. See The Judicial System of
Tennessee, TABLR III p. 18 supra. Youngstown also showed deficiencies in criminal case
processing while it was compiling an excellent record of tort dispositions. UNIVERSITY OF
AxRON, supra note 23, at 117-19.
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trators. In New Jersey in particular, although judges must account for
their expenditure of time, it is the administrators who must account,
through their own hierarchy, for the disposition of cases and the length
of their pendency and therefore are inferentially made responsible for
disposition time. The results of such a system are so demonstrably poor
in terms of dispositional speed that Ohio's new Rules of Superintendence
make the judges responsible not only for the reporting function but
also for the speedy movement of cases.
The third system, that of bar control, is virtually complete in South
Carolina, where the attorneys control not only whether and when a
case gets on the trial calendar, but also whether and when it gets on the
trial list or roster for any of the many short terms of court in that
state. Since the judges are rotated from circuit to circuit at short in-
tervals, a certain amount of judge shopping results from this form of
control. In Louisiana the control is less complete, but it is nonetheless
evident. No case goes on the trial calendar until one of the counsel for
the parties formally moves for its placement thereon. If it is not placed
on the calendar, the case may pend for as long as five years without
action until the local prescription doctrine eliminates it from considera-
tion by the court. Similarly, in South Carolina, the case may remain
on the calendar for only eight terms of court before being stricken.4
Although the Florida and Tennessee experience would appear to
demonstrate the complete superiority of judicial control over case
movement, there is a curious variation in the rate of case disposition
under the three different systems. Judicial control appears to accom-
plish a relatively even rate of case dispositions, month by month, at the
rate of five percent or more per month for the first 90 percent of dis-
positions. Thereafter the production rate declines markedly. In the
'bar control states, early dispositions are apt to be nearly as prompt for
the first few months, but as the 60 to 70 percent disposition mark is
reached the rate of production tapers off sharply and the remaining
cases move toward disposition very slowly if at all. These cases-un-
tried, unsettled, and undismissed-apparently were filed without serious
intention of pursuing them to the ultimate decision and they remain
48. This was not the course of events planned by Chief Justice Vanderbilt, who con-
templated that the Assignment Judge would be "directly responsible for the manage-
ment of the civil and criminal calendars in both the Superior and County Courts and
for the assignment of cases for trial." KLEIN & LEE, SELECTED WRITINGS OF ARTHmU
T. VANDERBILT 95 (1965). The assignment clerk, contemplated by Vanderbilt as an
assistant to the Assignment Judge, now tends to look to the local court administrator
'for direction and guidance on calendar matters and to submit case progress and dk-
position reports through administrative channels.
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to clog the docket, if not the calendar, until they are stricken by opera-
tion of law. 49 In the administrator controlled states, by contrast, the dis-
positions tend to be fewer and slower during the early months of
pendency, but the rate rises sharply after about 18 months of pendency,
overtaking eventually that of the states which practice bar control of
the process.
TABLE V illustrates the time differential between the three systems.
TABLE V
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Pretrial and its Incidents
Pretrial, as adopted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure more
than 30 years ago, was to have been a great saver of time and effort
in the civil trial process, even before the litigation explosion of the
1960's. It was designed to identify the true issues of the law suit and
thus save trial time; it was to eliminate, or at least reduce, disputatious
wrangling in the courtroom over relatively minor peripheral issues, and
49. Striking from the calendar under Circuit Rule 82 does not result in disposition
of the case. It remains pending and may be restored to the calendar on motion.
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it was to promote settlement of cases, thus clearing the dockets. As
such it was accepted on faith, on the logic of its devisors, and on the
distinguished support of the authors of the federal rules. Glowing ac-
counts of the early users were accepted as the equivalent of empirical
proof of its utility, just as were the pronouncements of Pound and
Vanderbilt accepted as to the value of parajudicial talent and just as
the comments of federal judges were accepted as to the superiority of
the individual judge's docket."0
Then the blow fell. New Jersey decided to determine just how
much judicial time and effort were saved and how much settlement
was achieved by the use of pretrial conferences. It engaged Professor
Maurice Rosenberg and the Institute for Effective Justice to make em-
pirical studies in the field. What resulted was probably the closest
approach made by lawyers to the physical science method in studying
a particular phase of the litigation process.51 All personal injury cases
in seven counties were divided randomly into two groups, one of
which routinely went to pretrial conference while the other did nor.
Thus, the second group served as a control. Three thousand cases were
studied in order to determine the length of time involved and the re-
sults accomplished.52 Principal among the findings of the controlled
experiment were: Pretrial did not eliminate unneeded witnesses or jury
trials; it did not shorten trials; and it did not produce earlier settlements.
As a result, not only did pretrial fail to save judge time per case but
it actually added to the expenditure of time by that amount devoted
to the pretrial conference. 51
The reaction to the findings was prompt. New Jersey abandoned
compulsory pretrial to save judicial time, granting it only when spe-
50. Although a few federal courts had been on individual judge's docket for many
years, the chief pressures in that direction have been recent. These forces are led
by Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark (ret.), Judge Alfred Murrah (ret.) of the Federal
Judicial Center and Chief Judge Waiter Ghourley (ret.), of the Western District
of Pennsylvania. The system, in some respects, is a return to the pre-organization days
which were aptly described by the late Chief Justice Taft, in a speech before the
American Bar Association in 1921 as one in which "each judge paddled his own canoe"
under a "go as you please" system. See Ki.am & LEF, supra note 48, at 68-69.
51. The jury experiment, conducted by Professors Kalven and Zeisel under the
sponsorship of the American Bar Association, used the more common social science
techniques of interview and questionnaire as described in H. KALvEN, JR. & H. ZEisrEi,
Tim AamucAN JuRnx (1966). Its one strong effort to get beyond the opinion recording
stage by "bugging" a jury deliberation room ran into serious newspaper and legislative
criticism, and the results were deleted from the study report.
52. M. RosEmRG, THE PREmuA CONFERENcE Ain EFrrnvn JusmcE 18-20 (1964).
53. Id. at 67-70.
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cifically requested. Whenever possible it substituted the voluntary "set-
dement conference," frequently without using the judge as catalyst in
the settlement and using, instead, a panel of lawyers, much as did Penn-
sylvania with its compulsory arbitration plan. Other states followed
suit, but without abandoning the title of the operation. Pretrial, as
used in many jurisdictions, may now mean either: (1) the classic Nims
conference to simplify issues and eliminate minor disputes, (2) the
boiler room settlement conference, or (3) mass pretrial, in which only
the odds-on proof of liability and the going rate of compensation for
specific injuries are really in issue, with many parties in many cases
in the same courtroom and the judge sitting nearby in chambers to
approve settlements. 54
But one of the Rosenberg findings, fundamental to the early dispo-
sition of cases, was largely ignored in the rapid retreat from the classic
pretrial conference procedure. This was the finding that "pretrial im-
proves the settlement process," and that the mutual knowledge of the
litigants was more frequently high in the pretried than in the non-
pretried cases.55 If pretrial improved the settlement process, it neces-
sarily must have done so in one of two ways: by hastening the time
of settlement in those cases which would have settled in any event, or
by making possible the settlement of those cases which, without pre-
trial, would have had to be tried. Otherwise the improvement would
be a qualitative matter impossible to measure accurately.
The summary of the test findings negates the first of these alternatives
with the flat statement:
Claim: (4) Pretrial shortens the time required to settle cases that
do not reach trial.
Not Supported: Pretrial did not decrease the time lapse from filing
to disposition for settled cases.56
This leaves open only the question of whether the New Jersey pre-
trials studied were then scheduled so close to the expected trial date
that any further shortening of the time lapse to settlement would be
impractical. The findings are not illuminating on this point, and such
a reservation would seem to be consistent with the statement of Mr.
Justice Brennan, in commenting on the New Jersey pretrial system, that
"a very small percentage of settlements are reached at the pretrial con-
54. UNmvuvsrrY OF AK~oN, supra note 19, at 67.
55. M. RosENBERG, supra note 52, at 68.
56. Id. at 69.
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ference itself. They usually come before the day, a few weeks later,
when the cases in the weekly call for assignment of a trial date or at
the call on trial day before assignment of the case to a trial judge." 11As to the second alternative, settlement of cases which would other-
wise not settle, the findings of the New Jersey study are somewhat less
direct, and both the claim and the answer are stated in social science
or opinion poll terms:
Claim: (5) Pretrial judges believe that pretrial 'will frequently
eliminate trials.
Not Supported: Pretrial judges infrequently predicted that the
pretrial 'would eliminate the need for trial.5"
The judges' opinions, which are thus elliptically used as a substitute
for express factual findings, contradict Mr. Justice Brennan's statistics,
which indicate that before pretrial was instituted in New Jersey in
1947, only 45 percent of the cases were settled and that by 1953-54,
with use of pretrial, the settlement rate climbed to 78 percent. 9
As indicated in the Brennan statement, a delayed settlement, rather
than settlement at the pretrial conference itself, would justify the in-
stitution of pretrial. Most participants in the process tend to ignore
Justice Brennan's warning that the close of the conference is too early
a time to expect settlement, and assume that the conference is a failure
if settlement does not occur on the spot. Thus, it is particularly un-
fortunate that the settlement conclusion is stated in terms of opinion
of the pretrial judges who, under New Jersey practice, have no re-
sponsibility for the disposition of the case after the pretrial conference
has ended. 0
Another delayed consequence of the pretrial conference is com-
mented upon by Professor Rosenberg in his procedure casebook, the
second edition of which was published subsequent to the test findings.6'
With regard to the activism of the judge, he poses the question: "May
he compel each side to disclose the names of trial witnesses it means to
call? If he may do these things, ought he to?" Disclosure of witnesses
has long been insisted upon by judges in federal courts, and is being
1 57. Remarks by Mr. Justice Brennan, ABA Section on Judicial Administration,
August 23, 1955. Reprinted in 17 F.RD. 479, 485.
58. M. RosENBERG, supra note 52, at 68.
59. Note 57 supra.
60. In the New Jersey test the pretrial judge was also the trial judge in only 18
percent of the tried cases. M. RosENBERG, supra note 52, at 21.
61. RosmmRG, WErNsTEIN & Sarrr, ErLtmE,"s oF Cmn. Pocnuan 760 (2d ed. 1970)."
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adopted in many progressive state trial courts as an incident of pretrial.
This insistence has the virtue of being one more court-imposed dis-
covery technique which adds to the mutual knowledge of the litigants
and, in the opinion of those using it, to the post-conference but pre-
trial, settlement rate.
A third incident or consequence of the pretrial conference which
affects the mutual knowledge of the case is that of discovery cutoff.
In many jurisdictions which use the classic pretrial conference instead
of the settlement conference or mass pretrial, the date of pretrial marks
the compulsory end of the discovery process. This is accomplished in
one of two ways: Either the request for trial, which by rule includes
the pretrial conference, must contain certification by the moving party
that all discovery is complete and no more is contemplated, or the
court by rule may require that no discovery be permitted after the
conference except on special application and the showing of cause by
way of new information. The use of either of these devices to cut off
discovery requires the parties to be diligent in discovery and, more
importantly, to be informed fully as to the nature of the case by pre-
trial time and thus better prepared to evaluate and, eventually, to
settle it. A very real problem of many pretrial judges has always been
the cavalier attitude of counsel toward the court's warning that they
must be as prepared for pretrial as they would be for trial. In many
areas and with many trial counsel, case preparation is postponed until
after the pretrial conference and the theoretical sanctions of default or
dismissal for unpreparedness are simply too harsh on the parties, since
it was counsel that was at fault. The minor sanction of forbidding dis-
covery after pretrial apparently has been vastly more successful in
producing counsel prepared for discussing settlement either at the con-
ference itself or shortly thereafter. The Tennessee courts, which gen-
erally do not use the pretrial conference, have achieved the same level
of preparedness of counsel by the happenstance results of restrictive
legislation. In that state a medical witness need not respond to a sub-
poena to testify in court if he is willing to give a deposition for reading
in evidence at trial. This, of course, requires that the deposition be
taken well in advance in order to allow the reporter time to transcribe
it, and the Tennessee plaintiffs are forced to take early depositions of
their own medical witnesses, not for discovery, but for perpetuation of
testimony. Many do it quite early, and since the right of cross exami-
nation must be extended, their adversaries are afforded the advantage
of early discovery which might otherwise be foregone until the last
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minute.6 The result is that the litigants will gain mutual knowledge
of one another's case early in the litigation process. This is the sine qua
non of early settlement.
The final beneficial incident or consequence of the pretrial confer-
ence is that, if the mutual knowledge of the litigants increases, then
a fortiori, that of the trial judge must increase greatly. In New Jersey,
with a master calendar system, and clerks or assignment judges setting
trials, the extent of the trial judge's knowledge of the details of the
case is probably not of much moment. But where, under an individual
judge's docket system, the pretrial judge is also necessarily the trial
judge, and where, particularly in the South, he also schedules the trial,
the knowledge is invaluable. Knowing more about the case and the
attitude of counsel toward it, he can make an intelligent assessment of
the chances of settlement and, if it is not settled, of the probable length
of the trial. He can therefore match two or three cases for trial on the
same day in accordance with their respective settlement possibilities
with reasonable assurance that he is neither overloading the day's trial
schedule nor inviting frequent calendar breakdowns when the only
case scheduled on a given day is settled or must be continued for some
emergency reason. As to those cases which must be tried, the judge
in scheduling them is in possession of knowledge of whether they are
half day, full day or two day trials and can consequently allot the
proper amount of time for them. This knowledge on the part of the
trial judge and his ability to schedule for trial more cases than could
possibly be tried is an effective argument in favor of both the indi-
vidual judge's docket and the judge's obligation not to delegate the trial-
setting function.
CONCLUSIONS
It is to be regretted that the Conference on the Judiciary and its
Consensus Statement offered the court modernizers a structural pattern
which, however logical in concept, does not seem to expedite the
handling of civil cases. The most unfortunate element in its findings is
that, although the Conference was composed primarily of judges, who
62. For plaintiffs' (and defendants') counsel who are horrified at the thought that
they might be deprived of the visual and oral skills of eminent practitioners of the
forensic medical art, there is now available the video taped deposition for experts, used
extensively in Michigan and in the U. S. District Court for Western Pennsylvania
where recording and storage facilities are provided in the courthouse. An entire trial
was produced on video tape as an experiment in Sandusky, Ohio. For a critique
see 45 Omio BAR 1, 25, 51.
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are noted for weighing facts, and of consultants, who are noted for
digging them out and presenting them, the basic facts as presented
in statistical studies seem to have been largely ignored. It is not that
these facts were unavailable; the Calendar Status Studies were prepared
by one of the consultant sponsors, and the time in process measure-
ments, at least for Ohio, Tennessee, and South Carolina, were avail-
able prior to Conference time. Had these studies, as well as those
of the Institute of Court Management on methodology in the metro-
politan courts, been consulted and analyzed, some of the Consensus
conclusions might well have been altered. Certainly the Conference
should have felt an obligation to the court modernizers to support its
abrupt reversal of 30 years of planning with reasons, if not the docu-
mentation of empirical studies. A possible reason for an attitude of
"Don't bother us with facts, our minds are made up," lies in the rever-
ence of many of those attending for the opinions of eminent jurists.
It is inconceivable to some that the propositions of a Pound or a Vander-
bilt, quoted so many times by modern authorities, could possibly be
in error, and no statistics could possibly shake such a belief.
The same criticism may be noted as to other conclusions stated in
the Consensus. If a tenured, disciplined, and well-paid judiciary is so
superior to one composed of short-term scramblers in the election
process, then why does it not produce superior results in terms of expe-
dition of civil cases? If non-judicial court managers are so necessary to
expedite the business of the courts, then why do they not produce faster
dispositions in those jurisdictions in which administrators have been
relied upon to do just this?
The lack of consistency of some recommendations, as applied to the
civil, particularly the tort claim, process as well as the dwelling on the
minutiae of the criminal case processing, may well be traceable to the
financing of the Conference with Law Enforcement Assistance funds.
Certainly none should object to a conference aimed at the improvement
of the criminal process. But many could, with reason, object to the
one-sided conclusions of a Consensus Statement which purports to be
concerned with the whole state of the legal process and turns out,
on analysis, to be tinkering with its structure for the hidden purpose
of improving only one facet of its operation at the obvious expense
of other, equally important, facets. Some balance of approach was
needed; it was not exhibited. The welfare of the important private and
civil sector was sacrificed completely to the overriding demands of the
public criminal sector. A solution for swollen civil dockets which
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recommends removal of important parts of the civil case load from
the area of the courts' jurisdiction is no solution at all. It is merely-a
confession of inadequacy.
Part of the explanation of these inconsistencies may lie in the guest
list and the format of the Conference itself. While there were many
authorities on trial court operation in Williamsburg, they were the
authorities who view it from the record on appeal and the reading of
opinions on appeal. Those familiar with the pit of the jury trial court-
room and the boiler room of the calendar control operation were in
relatively short supply. The Conference followed the pattern of a few
inspirational speeches by public figures, together with small group semi-
nars operating in what used to be called the buzz session technique but
is now dignified under the name "process." The technique is an excel-
lent one for isolating and emphasizing problems, but it has produced no
evidence of success in solving complex problems. The seminars, with
their need for the give and take of informal debate and tolerance, for
"off the top of the head" opinion, could scarcely be expected to study
a mass of statistical data and come to reasoned analysis of what it
proved or did not prove. Thus, the Conference necessarily produced
a consensus of logic, of opinion, and even of prejudice on certain points.
It is suggested that the next conference, if one be held, concern
itself with the civil process, particularly in the threatened tort field;
that it examine in detail the methodologies in the process rather than
confine itself to generalized opinion and undocumented statements
on jurisdictional and administrative structure; and that it use, rather than
ignore, the many empirical studies in the field. Court structure which
is embedded in state constitutions is difficult, costly, and time con-
suming to change. Alterations in methodology are not only more
quickly achieved but they involve only convincing the judges them-
selves of the need for them. Surely a conference which produces
persuasive proof of the need for method change would be more pro-
ductive of rapid court improvement than was the Williamsburg Con-
ference of March, 1971, although it might be less satisfying to the
scholarly theorists on court structure.
